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Abstract— We address the widely open problem of access
control in wireless sensor networks (WSN). Namely, we
apply a suitable threshold secret sharing scheme relying
on advanced polynomial interpolation theory to design a
distributed access control protocol exploiting the natural
hierarchical structure of the WSN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are commonly con-
sidered as one of the most important technologies for the
21st century, with challenging applications to environ-
mental monitoring, emergency medical care, industrial
remote control. As incisively summarized in [1], with
respect to general mobile ad hoc networks (MANET),
the peculiarities of a WSN are related to the unavoidable
presence of at least one base station and to the fact that a
sensor node has a small embedded processor with more
limited memory and energy, thus imposing stronger light
weighting requirements. Both WSN and MANET present
a larger spectrum of efficiency and security problems
than conventional wired and even wireless networks,
mainly related to higher vulnerability of nodes, often
placed in a hostile or dangerous environment where
they are not physically protected and hence are easy
to be captured, eavesdropped, or tampered. Indeed, as
clearly explained in [2], misbehavior in a MANET,
where nodes are both routers and terminals, can be
defined as deviation from regular routing and forward-
ing and without suitable countermeasures the effects of
misbehavior have been shown to dramatically decrease
network performance.
Here we mainly focus on the crucial issue of additional
node access. As pointed out in the recent contribution
[3], little work has been reported so far to address the
access control problem in sensor networks. As clearly
explained in the same paper, the critical problem from
this point of view is that under current sensor network
security technology a malicious new node could join the
network and become indistinguishable from legitimate
new nodes. Here we exploit distributed access as a
reliable solution. This way, a node trying to access the
WSN needs to get authorization from different WSN
participants. In the present paper we introduce a novel
access control protocol based on a hierarchical secret
sharing scheme. Namely, we propose to adapt distributed
access to a fixed hierarchical structure. Just to suggest
a couple of realistic examples, we outline the following
scenarios:
(i) a reputation mechanism ([2]) is active–it can either
be distributed (see for instance [4]), where each node
rates the behavior of neighboring nodes and updates a
reputation metric for each of them; or centralized (see
for instance [4]), where a trusted supervision authority
communicates with all nodes and store nodes reputa-
tions, thus alleviating the need for sharing locally kept
reputation metrics;
(ii) the WSN is regarded as to be intrinsically hierar-
chical, with a higher level corresponding to the manager
nodes in the base stations, a middle level collecting
cluster heads with the role of master agents, and a lowest
level with all other remaining nodes, acting as slave
agents ([1]).
We propose a distributed access control scheme which
takes into account such different trust levels. More
precisely, we design a hierarchical secret sharing scheme
which allows a new node to access the network by
requiring authorization from a prescribed configuration
of nodes of different levels. Communication among the
new node and its neighbors in the network can be
easily made secure (in particular from eavesdropping) by
key pre-distribution or public key cryptography (see for
instance [3]). Note also that hierarchical secret sharing
has already been successfully applied to security issues
in ad hoc networks in [5].
We recall that a (k, n)-threshold sharing scheme al-
lows to divide a secret into n shares and requires the
knowledge of at least k out of n shares to reconstruct
the original content. The basic scheme, due to Shamir
[6], relies on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation
and allows a hierarchical variant by simply assigning
a higher number of shares to higher level participants.
Here instead we exploit a more sophisticated mathe-
matical tool, namely, Birkhoff interpolation [7], which
involves not only the polynomial, but also its higher
order derivatives. Roughly speaking, the idea is to split
the secret access key needed to access the network into
several hierarchical shares and to provide each WSN
node with a different share corresponding to its level.
This seems to be more efficient (assigning just one share
to each member) and realistic (attributing a qualitative
rather than a quantitative difference between distinct
levels). Next, the nice geometrical properties of Birkhoff
polynomial interpolation allow a further node to join
the network after reconstructing the secret key from a
subset of nodes if and only if such a subset contains
a prescribed number of members for each level in the
network hierarchy.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section
II we introduce the concept of access structure, while
in Section III the distributed access control protocol is
described. Some concluding remarks and future perspec-
tives are reported in Section IV, while Section V is fully
devoted to more technical mathematical arguments.
II. HIERARCHICAL ACCESS STRUCTURE
Here we describe how to manage the access key in
a distributed way among nodes belonging to different
levels of the fixed hierarchy (see example in Fig. 1).
Let the WSN be composed of n nodes and let us
consider a collection Γ of subsets of the network. A
threshold secret sharing scheme with access structure Γ
is a method of sharing a secret among the nodes of the
WSN, in such a way that only subsets in Γ can recover
the secret, while all other subsets have no information
about it. Hence we have to assume that Γ is monotone
in the sense that if V ∈ Γ then any set containing V also
belongs to Γ. We also assume that the WSN participants
are divided into t + 1 levels, i.e., WSN= ∪tl=0Nl with
Ni ∩Nj = ∅ for every i 6= j (levels may change in time
due to the dynamic nature of the WSN). In order to
reconstruct the secret, we require at least a fixed number
of shares from each level (see example in Fig. 2).
Fig. 1. Example of hierarchical WSN structure: dashed line nodes
consist on nodes of higher level; thick solid line nodes are middle
level nodes; thin solid line nodes consist on nodes of lower level.
Fig. 2. Example of distributed access control: the squared node
obtains the required authorization to join the network of Figure 1
from at least three nodes of middle or lower level, among which at
least one of middle level.
Formally, if 0 < k0 < . . . < kt is a strictly increasing
sequence of integers, then a (k0, . . . , kt;n)-hierarchical
threshold secret sharing scheme distributes to each WSN
participant a share of a given (periodically refreshed)
secret access key S, in such a way that
Γ =
{
V ⊂ WSN : #
[
V ∩
(
∪il=0Nl
)]
≥ ki ∀i
} (1)
Roughly speaking, a subset of nodes can reconstruct the
secret key if and only if it contains at least k0 members
of level 0; at least k1 members of level 0 and/or level 1;
at least k2 members of level 0 and/or 1 and/or 2; and so
on.
More precisely, in order to define a suitable
(k0, . . . , kt;n)-hierarchical threshold secret sharing
scheme for WSN node access control (see Fig. 3) we
can proceed as follows.
1) Identify the secret key S for access control with
a sequence (S0, . . . , Sz) with Si ∈ R for every
0 ≤ i ≤ z.
2) Let k = kt and pick a polynomial
p (x) =
k−1∑
i=0
aix
i (2)
where ai =
{
Si 0 ≤ i ≤ z
random z + 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
Shares distributionPolynomial coefficients Derivatives Evaluation at WSN nodesAccess key
Fig. 3. Access key distribution among WSN participants.
3) Identify each node of level l with a random ele-
ment v ∈ R and associate to v the share p(kl−1) (v),
where p(kl−1) (v) denotes the kl−1-th derivative of
p and by definition k−1 = 0.
Intuitively speaking, an evaluation of the polynomial
itself carries more information than an evaluation of
any of its derivatives since it involves more coefficients;
therefore it sounds reasonable to assign to a participant
of higher level the evaluation of a lower order derivative.
In such a way, we will be able to apply Birkhoff
interpolation theory to properly define and effectively
manage a hierarchical access structure.
III. ACCESS CONTROL PROTOCOL
In order to access the WSN, a node vnew needs to
reconstruct the secret key S. We propose the following
strategy (see Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4. Access control protocol.
1) Starting from the idle state (state 0), the node vnew
sends an access request in broadcast, starting at the
same time a suitable timeout procedure in order to
avoid deadlocks, and waits for acknowledgments
from the network (state 1).
2) A node vi, already belonging to the net-
work, can reply to vnew by sending in uni-
cast an acknowledgment containing the data(
k0, . . . , kt; li, vi, p
(kli−1) (vi)
)
, where li denotes
the hierarchical level of vi. After receiving any
acknowledgments, vnew stores them (state 2) until
either vnew collects a subset of shares belonging
to the access structure Γ or time expires, in which
case the access control protocol fails.
3) The node vnew has now at its disposal the shares
corresponding to a subset V = {v1, . . . , vm} ∈ Γ
with m ≥ k. Up to reordering we may assume that
vi ∈ Vli with li ≤ lj for every i ≤ j. Consider the
m× k matrix MV whose i-th row is given by
d
dxkli−1
(
1, x, x2, . . . , x(k−1)
)
(vi) (3)
In order to reconstruct the secret key S, vnew has
to solve the following linear system:
MV


a0
.
.
.
ak−1

 =


pkl1−1 (v1)
.
.
.
pklm−1 (vm)

 (4)
in the unknowns a0, . . . , ak−1. Indeed, the fact that
V ∈ Γ implies that (4) has a unique solution
(see Mathematical Appendix), corresponding by
definition of the coefficients ai to the secret key S
(state 3, see also Fig. 5). Hence the access control
protocol is over and vnew can access the network.
from an authorized
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Fig. 5. Access key reconstruction.
We point out that the same procedure could be adapted
(by replacing S and Γ with the access key S′ and the
access structure Γ′ corresponding to a higher level of the
WSN hierarchy) by a node v already belonging to the
network in order to upgrade its level.
IV. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the peculiarities of WSN among
MANET and providing a couple of examples of natural
hierarchical structures for WSN, we have introduced
a novel distributed access control protocol for WSN
which is adapted to a fixed hierarchical structure. The
protocol is based on a sophisticated threshold secret
sharing scheme relying on advanced polynomial inter-
polation theory. Full rigorous mathematical details have
already been provided, while a thorough both numerical
and experimental evaluation of the proposed method is
currently the subject of work in progress.
V. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Here we provide the theoretical framework for secret
reconstruction, namely we show that the following holds:
Theorem 1. The secret S can be reconstructed from the
shares belonging to V if and only if V ∈ Γ.
The key point is that (4) is a Birkhoff interpolation
problem according to the following:
Definition 1. Let E = (Ei,j), i = 1, . . . , m; j =
0, . . . , k − 1, be an m × k interpolation matrix, with k
entries equal to one and all remaining ones equal to zero.
Let X = x1, . . . , xm, x1 < x2 < . . . < xm, be a set of
m distinct interpolation points. The associated Birkhoff
interpolation problem is given by the k interpolation
equations
p(j)(xi) = Bi,j (5)
for every i, j with Ei,j = 1, where p(j) denotes the j-th
derivative of a polynomial p of degree ≤ k−1, Bi,j ∈ R
are given data, and the unknowns are the k coefficients
a0, . . . , ak−1 of p.
Moreover, recall from [7], p. 126, that by elementary
linear algebra if the interpolation matrix E = (Ei,j),
i = 1, . . . , m; j = 0, . . . , k − 1 does not satisfy the
following Po´lya condition
# {Ei,j = 1 : j ≤ h} ≥ h + 1, 0 ≤ h ≤ k − 1 (6)
then the corresponding Birkhoff interpolation problem
admits infinitely many solutions.
The interpolation matrix EV = (Ei,j), i = 1, . . . , m;
j = 0, . . . , k − 1 associated to (4) is:
Ei,j =
{
1 if j = kl(i)−1
0 otherwise (7)
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following
auxiliary result (see [5] Lemma 1):
Lemma 1. V ∈ Γ if and only if EV satisfies the Po´lya
condition.
Proof of Theorem 1: First we show that if V /∈ Γ
then the secret S cannot be reconstruct by V . Indeed,
by Lemma 1 EV does not satisfy Po´lya condition and
it follows that the corresponding Birkhoff interpolation
problem admits infinitely many solutions. Thus V cannot
reconstruct the secret.
Next, we have to check that if V ∈ Γ then V is
enough to recover the secret S. In order to do so, by
Lemma 1 and our random selection of the interpolation
points, we can apply Theorem 10.1 in [7], p.128, and
conclude that the Birkhoff interpolation problem admits
a unique solution, which conveys the embedded secret.
Hence Theorem 1 is completely proven.
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